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The Brady Plan's proposals represent an important
advance in the conception of how to manage the
problems of the highly indebted countries (HICs). The
positive, aspects of the proposal can be best
appreciated by first examining the scope and
limitations of the Brady Plan's predecessor, the Baker
Plan, and more specifically, the second stage of that
Plan, the so-called Market Menu Approach.
The Market Menu Approach emerged in 1987 on
account of the shortcomings of the Baker Plan's
original formula for restoring growth in the highly
indebted developing countries, which involved
intensification of economic reforms in the debtor
countries, coupled with a redoubled effort to mobilise
concerted loans for them from commercial banks ad
official lenders.' As it became evident that the
commercial banks were unwilling to support the
Baker Plan's lending commitments, the official focus
shifted to the so-called Menu Approach as a way to
overcome the problem of developing countries'
growing financing constraint.2
The Menu concept essentially supplemented new
concerted lending packages by the banks with other
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The Baker Plan was announced in September 1985 and 'promised'
to mobilise US$29 bu over three years for 15 heavily indebted
developing countries (Argentina. Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Ivory Coast. Mexico. Morocco. Nigeria. Peru. Philippines,
Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia). Later Jamaica and Costa
Rica were added to the list. US$20 bu was to come from commercial
banks and tJS$9 bu from official lenders. However, programmed
bank financing - which represented a modest 2'/. per cent annual
expansion of exposure - proved difficult to mobilise. in part
because by 1986 commercial banks had substantially reduced their
vulnerability to default and therefore had less incentive to lend in
concerted fashion to problem borrowers. Indeed. World Bank data
suggest that net lending by banks totalled only US$6 bu over 1986-
88, in contrast to US$15 bn for official lenders. Source: World Bank,
Quarter/v Review, Washington DC, March 1989, p. 3.
2 For a more completed analysis of the evolution of the official debt
management strategy and the emergence of the Market Men,,
Approach, see CEPAL. l.a Era/scion del Pro/denia de la Dije/a
Erlerne, en .4nii'riea latina e el Cari/si', Estudios e Informes de la
CEPAL No. 72. Santiago, Chile. 1988 and Robert Devlin, Debt and
Crisis in latin A,nerica: The Supp/r Side of 1/le Store (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, Chapters 5 and 6).
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financing options. On the one hand, the Menu
proposed the use of alternative new money instruments
such as trade and project loans, international bond
placements and limited capitalisation of interest
payments. On the other, it introduced for the first time
in the management ofthe debt problem the possibility
of financing the debtor countries through debt
reduction techniques such as debt-equity swaps, debt-
bond exchanges, and buybacks. In the official scheme,
the items on the Menu had to emerge voluntarily from
the market on a case-by-case basis in negotiations
between the debtor country and its creditor banks.
Moreover, the creditor governments made it
emphatically clear that their support of the Menu
could nor involve costs for their taxpayers, i.e., public
guarantees and the like to enhance financing packages
were explicity excluded from the official management
strategy.
Although appearing in 1987, the Menu did not gain
concrete form until 1988 when an array of its market-
based options actually emerged from the negotiations
between debtors and creditors. Moreover, financing
schemes tended to stress debt reduction techniques, in
part because net lending by the banks had become
practically impossible to mobilise. Indeed, according
to World Bank estimates net bank financing to the
highly indebted countries, after adjustment for the net
movement of arrears, was only US$500 mn in 1988,
compared to an already low figure of US$7 bn in
1987.
Events in Latin America, where the bulk of the highly
indebted countries are located, were indicative of the
general situation in 1988, Indeed, new money
operations were a rare event. Brazil secured a
US$5.2 bn loan in June as part of a package that
rescheduled US$62 bn of outstanding debt. The terms
were a 12-year maturity and an interest rate of0.8 I per
cent over LIBOR. Venezuela also secured some new
money, but by exploiting a non-conventional option
in the menu: bond placements. During the year the
country emitted four bonds worth approximately
US$350 mn. The notes typically had a maturity of five
years and interest rates ranging from 11.13 per cent
fixed, to 1.13-1.88 per cent over LIBOR.4 Finally, in
early 1989 Colombia - the only HIC to avoid a
rescheduling - secured a new money commitment
World Bank, op.eit., p.3.
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involving a US$1.5bn loan from its bank creditors
with a 12% year maturity and a 0.88 per cent spread
over LIBOR, coupled with a US$0.2 bn bond
placement carrying an eight year maturity and a
spread of 1.5 per cent over LIBOR.
Aside from the small number of HICs which were able
to secure new bank credit, the volume of loans for
those privileged few countries was disappointing also.
In the Brazilian operation, nearly two-thirds of the
loan was earmarked to liquidate interest arrears
accumulated a year earlier. Meanwhile, the two-year
financing package for Colombia, in addition to being
extremely difficult to organise, fell short of the cost of
upcoming amortisation. That means that the creditor
banks actually will reduce their exposure in a country
that by most any standard is quite creditworthy.
Finally, the Venezuelan issues were both small and
extremely expensive. Moreover, much of the money
was reportedly subscribed by Venezuelan residents,
making the bonds more of a vehicle for repatriating
capital flight than an international bond placement as
such.
As for the debt reduction items in the Menu, 1988
began with an interesting operation in Mexico in
which the government proposed to trade up to
US$20 bn of restructured public debt for US$10 bn of
bonds with a single maturity of 20 years and an annual
interest rate of 1.63 per cent over LIBOR (compared to
0.81 per cent over LIBOR for the restructured debt).
To enhance the new government bond, Mexico
indicated a willingness to guarantee its principal by
using the country's foreign exchange reserves to make
a parallel purchase of a specially issued US Treasury
zero-coupon bond with a face value and a maturity
identical to that of the Mexican instrument.5
The proposed scheme at the time was hailed in some
circles as the solution to the problem of the HICs.6
However, the launching of the operation ran into a
number of unexpected difficulties. Gaining the
necessary waivers from the banks to initiate the
conversion operation was not as difficult as it might
have been because protracted negotiations over a
March 1987 rescheduling agreement had already
exempted public debt from the sharing clause, which
4Venezuelaundertookfouroperations in l988:(i)a US$100 mn flote
in February which carried a five-year maturity and a fixed rate of
Il i/5 per cent; (ii) another US$100 mn issue in August carrying a
five-year maturity and a spread over LtBOR of l7/ per cent; (iii) a
DM$100 mn issue in November carrying a five year maturity and a
8i/ percent fixed interest rate and finally; (iv) a US$500 mn issue in
December, of which only US$100 mn was in cash, the rest being
composed of restructured private sector debt. This latter operation
carried maturities of six, ten and IS years and an interest rate of
I i/ per cent over LIBOR.
For more detail on the Mexican proposal, see Ruben Lamdany,
June 1988, 'Voluntary Debt Reduction Operations: Bolivia, Mexico
and Beyond , .', Washington DC. World Bank,
6'Mexico's New Bond Scheme Points to Long Term Solution to
Region's Debt Crisis', II January 1988, Busine,'sLatinAme,'ica, p.9.
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required approval of 100 per cent of the banks. The
remaining obstacle was the negative pledge clause
which had to be waived to collateralise the new bonds.
Since this waiver required the consent of only 51 per
cent of the banks, it was secured within two months.
The major problems arose on other fronts.
First, Mexico's collateral was for principal only, which
represented just 18 per cent of the discounted/present
value of the 20 year Mexican bond. In other words, the
banks perceived that 80 per cent of the income stream
on the bond was unsecured Mexican risk. The
Mexican authorities tried to overcome this problem by
asserting that the new bond would be senior to existing
loans, but most banks were apparently unconvinced
about seniority being created by fiat. Second, the
attractiveness of the offer was reduced by a ruling of
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
which stated that US banks would have to write down
all loans tendered for the exchange, even if ultimately
they were not accepted by the Mexican government.
Third, the announcement of an offer to exchange up to
US$20 bn of debt for US$10 bn of bonds implied a
discount of5O per cent on outstanding bank loans; yet
many institutions in the US had loan loss reserves
sufficient to cover discounts of only 25-30 per cent,7
while the Japanese banks were formally even less
covered for loan losses.8 Fourth, national tax codes
were such that for many European banks there was
little or no advantage to recognising the lower value of
their assets in an exchange. Fifth, the placement
confronted inherent free rider problems since certain
banks would be tempted to withhold their participation
in anticipation of having the value of their loans rise as
the absolute amount of Mexican debt fell. Finally, the
exchange offer was a very novel twist in the official
debt management strategy; it is well known that the
market reacts cautiously to new instruments and
therefore conversions of this type might normally be
expected to start quite small even under the best of
circumstances.9
The reaction of the market to the Mexican offer indeed
fell far short of initial expectations. In the auction
Mexico received 320 bids from about a quarter of the
country's nearly 500 creditor banks for a total value of
US$6.7 bu. The government accepted just 95 of those
bids valued at US$3.7 bu and traded them for
US$2.6 bn of Mexican bonds. Thus the average
discount on the operation was 30 per cent and bank
debt was reduced by US$1.1 bn. The government had
to expend about US$490 mn of foreign exchange
See CEPAL, 28 February 1989. 'Estudio Económico de tos Estados
Unidos 1987', Santiago, Chile. LC/G.l477, table 32.
Bouchet, M. and Hay. J. 'The Rise of the Market-Based Menu
Approach and Its Limitation',', Washington DC, World Bank,
1989. p. 19.
Keneth Telljohann, June 1987, 'Analytical Framework', Prospects
for Securitizat ion of Less Developed Country Loans, New York,
Salomon Brothers, p. II.
reserves to collateralise the new bonds, plus, in order
to avoid discrimination, at least another US$100 mn
had to be drawn upon to collateralise the country's
outstanding bonds already in circulation.
The results of the Mexican exchange offer clearly
disappointed creditors and debtors alike. Nevertheless,
even the most optimistic scenario of a US$10 bn debt
reduction would not have produced dramatic relief for
Mexico's harried balance of payments. This is because
the principal on the debt was not being paid and there
was little prospect of it being paid in the foreseeable
future. (Hence the 50 per cent discount on Mexican
debt trading in secondary markets in early 1988.) In
these circumstances, and with an interest rate on
rescheduled debt of lABOR +0.81 per cent, every
dollar of debt reduction brought with it at that time
only 8.8 cents of cash flow relief in the form of lower
interest payments.'° However, this interest savings
was partially offset by the fact that Mexico attempted
to enhance the new bond with a higher spread over
LIBOR than found on the old debt and also had to
disburse upfront liquid interest-earning foreign
exchange reserve to purchase collateral that would not
yield a cash flow for 20 years. Indeed, in these
circumstances a US$10 bn exchange would have
produced only slightly more than US$650 thousand
annually in net interest savings, compared to an
annual interest bill on the debt of nearly US$9 bn.
Moreover, in view of the need to disburse for
collateral, the net cash balance on that hypothetical
operation would have been negative for Mexico for the
first three years. With Mexico's actual voluntary
conversion being realised at a relatively low discount
and low volume, net annual interest savings will be
tiny and the net cash flow balance of the transaction
will be negative for Mexico for most of the 20 year life
of the agreement.'
Another important debt reduction operation was
launched in March 1988 by Bolivia. Because of
economic and political problems, this nation
° At that time LIBOR was about 8 per cent.
° Since LIBOR at that time was S per Cent, the hypothetical reduction
of US$10 bn of restructured debt would have reduced annual
interest payments by tJS$880 mn. On the other hand, the new
US$10 bn Mexican bond would have carried an interest rate that
was 0.82 per Cent higher than the rate on restructured debt,
generating additional interest Costs of tJS$82 mn per annum for the
country. Liquid foreign exchange reserves of tJS$2 bn would have
had tobe used to purchase collateral that would hase no cash return
for 20 years; hence, if those deposited reserves were earning a very
conservatively estimated 7 per annum, eash interest income of
US$140 nm per annum would have had to he foregone. Thus net
interest savings from the exchange would have been US$658
thousand annually. But since US$2 bn would have to he disbursed
for collateral, the cumulative net cash how would have been
negative for Mexico for the first three years. The interest savings and
cash now benefits, of course, fall as the exchange ratio worsens for
the debtor. Using the same assumptions about interest rates,
Mexico's actual exchange at a 30 per cent discount generated at tltat
time net annual interest savings of about tJS$35 mn and an overall
negative cash flow balance that would not he rectified for I 7 years.
unilaterally suspended its debt service in mid-1984,
After rescheduling its Paris Club debt in July 1986,
Bolivia began to actively negotiate a buyback of its
bank debt, worth about US$670 mn (excluding interest
on arrears), or 15 per cent of the country's total public
foreign debt. The country's bank debt had been
circulating in secondary markets at about 6 cents on
the dollar, but with news of a potential buyback,
secondary market prices quickly rose to 11-12 cents.
A year after initial contacts, in July 1987, Bolivia won
waivers of the already mentioned restrictive clauses
which were contained in a 1981 rescheduling
agreement. Among the conditions established for the
buyback were that the resources for the purchase had
to come from third party donors; the contributions
had to be placed in an TMF Trust Fund, and an
identical price would have to be offered to all the
country's bank creditors. The banks also won the
option to accept, in lieu of cash, 25-year collateralised
peso denominated zero-coupon bonds, which were
indexed to the US dollar and eligible for conversion
into local equity at a 50 per cent premium over their
face value.t2
The buyback was formally announced in January
1988 with an offer price of 11 cents on the dollar. In
March Bolivia announced that 53 of its 131 creditor
banks had made bids; nearly US$270 mn of debt was
exchanged for cash and US$64 mn for notes. The
outstanding debt was reduced by nearly half.
The buyback clearly illustrated how assistance from
the international public sector can accelerate a
reduction of outstanding bank debt. Indeed, the entire
operation would not have been feasible without the
resources provided by government donors and the
IMF's good offices. Nevertheless, the operation was
far from an unqualified success and revealed
shortcomings of the Market Menu Approach as then
conceived.
It is rather striking that facing an unquestionable state
of insolvency in Bolivia; an offer price that nearly
doubled that prevailing in the secondary market
before the announcement of a buyback, and the
availability of third party to finance a full scale
repurchase, only 40 per cent of the country's creditor
banks 'volunteered' to participate in the operation.
The reasons for this sluggish response are varied.
Some banks clearly preferred to free ride, evaluating
that with a reduced debt Bolivia might eventually be
willing to settle the remaining outstanding obligations
on terms more favourable to them. Other banks which
were fully reserved against Bolivian portfolio risk
estimated little immediate tax or accounting benefits
from a formal recognition of a loss; indeed, by sitting
tight a bank might achieve a windfall benefit from an
unexpected sharp rise in the country's terms of trade.
2 For a more detailed stimmary of the Bolivian operation see
Lamdany. o,n.cit.
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Other banks, with inadequate reserves against their
LDC exposure, would have wanted to avoid the losses
implied by participation in a buyback and thereby
keep their loans at book value. Finally, some
institutions undoubtedly preferred to avoid the
precedent of debt forgiveness.
Another problem was the rise in the secondary market
price itself. At 6 cents on the dollar the secondary
market had been valuing the country's US$670 mn
debt at US$40 mn. However, anticipating the buyback
the market price rose to roughly 11 cents, meaning
that the remaining unpurchased debt of US$336 mn
gained a market value of US$37 mn. Thus slightly less
than US$37 mn of cash and Bolivian notes bought
only a US$3 mn reduction in the market value of
outstanding obligations; in other words Bolivia paid
11 cents on the dollar for a debt with a marginal value
of less than one cent)3
Buying back a debt with a low marginal value is not
unequivocally the best alternative use of resources for
a country with a foreign exchange constraint; indeed
resources could conceivably be deployed more
productively for reforms, imports, investment, and
economic growth. Moreover, the allocation of
resources for a partial buyback even as large as that of
the Bolivian case does not necessarily alter dramatically
private investors' perception of risk; since after the
buyback the country was unable to service its
remaining bank debt, and those outstanding
obligations traded in secondary markets at a heavy
89 per cent discount, potential new investors would
undoubtedly still have their decisions affected by
perceptions of a long embattled queue for available
foreign exchange. Nevertheless, what perhaps made
the Bolivian operation attractive was that donor
resources were earmarked solely for the purpose of a
buyback and the country already had a significant
pipeline of commitments of foreign loans and grants
which it could absorb only gradually.
Perhaps the fullest expression of the Menu Approach
emerged in June 1988 when Brazil announced a new
financial package with its creditor banks that would
lead the country out of the moratorium which it had
declared in February 1987. As mentioned earlier, the
agreement included the traditional rescheduling of
principal on commercial terms and a new money
commitment. However, what was notable about the
agreement was the impressive array of menu items
incorporated into the financing.
As part of new money package of US$5.2 bn, Brazil
offered to issue, in lieu of new loans from the banks, up
o That is, one dollar in reduction olthe face value of the debt lowered
the market value by only 0.009 cents. This problem has ted some
analysts to declare buyback and conversions a 'boondoggle'. See
Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff, 1988, 'The Buyhack
Boondoggle', Brookings Papers on Economic Activity No. 2,
pp. 675-704.
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to US$1 bn of bonds in bearer form which would carry
the same terms as the loans. Moreover, US$2.9 bn of
the new money subscribed in the form of loans would
become eligible over 1989-1991 for conversion into
local equity at par, up to a limit of US$50 mn per
month.
Brazil also offered the banks an 'exit' option on the
restructured debt. In lieu of a rescheduling, the
creditors could exchange public sector medium term
debt for exit bonds valued at par with a 25-year
maturity and a fixed, below market interest rate of
6 per cent. The bonds were designed to offer those
banks which wished to avoid future reschedulings and
requests for new money a chance to 'exit' from the
process, but at the cost of accepting financial
instruments with lower interest rates and longer
maturities. To further enhance the instruments, Brazil
allowed the banks to convert the exit bonds at par into
cruzado denominated Brazilian Treasury notes
indexed, at the choice of the bank, to domestic
inflation or to the dollar exchange rate.
The entire new money package, as well as the exit
bonds, were additionally eligible to participate in
Brazil's newly inaugurated debt-equity swap auctions,
which began in February 1988. Other menu items in
the agreement involved a retiming of interest
payments from a quarterly to semi-annual basis and
relending provisions for restructured debt. 14
The Brazilian agreement was clearly innovative and
the best expression to date of the Menu Approach. But
again, as a vehicle for debt relief it was only a qualified
success. The subscription to the new money package
was indeed unusually quick, about one month. Yet
only 308 of Brazil's 500 commercial banks entered into
the agreement. Moreover, the participating banks'
chief motivation for the loans was Brazil's agreement
to liquidate more than US$3 bn of arrears and the
resulting very favourable interest receipts/new loan
ratio of four to one over the programme period 1987-
1989° Indeed, the signing of the new loan pact in
Brazil by itself was expected to increase US money
centre banks' 1988 earning per share by between 10
and 40 per cent.tt
The subscription to the exit bond, while much more
successful than a similar instrument promoted by
Argentina in l987,' nevertheless only attracted 108
banks for a total value ofUS$l bn, or 20 per cent of the
° For an analytical review of the retiming and relending provisions see
Ruben Lamdany. December 1988, 'The Market Based Menu
Approach in Action: The 1988 Braeil Financing Package',
Washington DC, world Bank.
° Bouchet and I-lay, aped.. p. 7.
° PeterTruell, 23 June ¡988, 'Bracil's Proposed Debt Pact is Expected
to Boost '88 Earnings of Big US Banks'. Wall Street Journal.
° In 1987 Argentina offered exit bonds with a 25-year maturity and a
fixed 4 per cent rate of interest. Only two banks subscribed. See
Lamdany, 'Market Based Menu Approach ...', op.cit.. p. 36.
amount which Brazil had originally offered to
exchange. At that time the conversion implied savings
of about US$30 mn per annum in interest payments,
which was far less than a bonanza in view of the then
US$11 bn annual interest burden on the debt.t8
In addition, considering that the new money eligible
for conversion into equity at face value corresponded
closely to the amount of interest payments in arrears,
and that the market then valued Brazilian obligations
at 50 cents on the dollar, a swap at par was an
unusually generous concession to the creditor banks.
Moreover, the conversions - which are to be
additional to the official debt-equity swap programme
- could make management of the country's severe
inflationary problem more difficult.
In April 1988 Chile had begun negotiations with its
creditors to amend loan contracts in order to
introduce more flexibility into the country's debt
management. Six months later, in September, the
requested amendments were approved by the banks to
allow: (i) direct buybacks of the debt at a discount for
an amount not to exceed US$500 mn and to be funded
exclusively from the country's foreign exchange
reserves; (ii) debt exchange offers for up to US$2 bn;
(iii) prepayments in pesos in cases where receipts are
re-lent to new investment projects and (iv) the
awarding of preferencial guarantees on new debt up to
anamount of US$500 mn. The pre-payment provision
was used during 1988 to extend US$35 mn in financing
to a local mining project, and in November Chile
deployed US$168 mn of its reserves to purchase
US$299 mn of debt, capturing a discount of 44 per
cent. 19
The Chilean initiative certainly did introduce needed
flexibility into the loan agreements. Yet the banks,
fearing moral hazard - put severe limits on the
volume of resources that could be managed in this new
way. Moreover, like any buyback operation, there is
the question of efficient allocation of rsources. At
that time the repurchase bought about US$16 mn per
annum in net interest savings; however, since the
country was required to make an outlay of US$168 mn
in reserves, the cumulative net cash flow on the
operation would remain negative for the next ten
years. 20
Undoubtedly the most dynamic source of debt
reduction in developing countries in 1988 involved
formal debt-equity swap programmes as well as
informal swaps, which are operations that do not
Evaluated at the LIBOR in mid-1988 (8 per cent) and a spread 01
0.81 percent on restructured debt.
Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, September 1988. 'Recompra dc la Deuda
de Chile', Santiago. Chile. CtEPLAN.
20To calculate net interest savings I applied November's I.1BOR of
9 per cent pitio a spread of 0.81 per cent for restructured debt and
very conservatively estimated interest earnings of 8 per cent per
annum on the foreign exchange reserves.
directly involve a country's monetary authorities, The
World Bank estimates total swaps of some US$l4bn
in 1988, compared to US$7 bn in 1987 and US$1.5 bn
in 19862t Most of the swaps occurred in four
countries: Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Argentina. Brazil
carried out by far the greatest volume of swaps;
estimates place them at US$8 bn, of which about
US$3.6 billion were in the country's formal pro-
gramme. Mexico also had a large number of informal
swaps, estimated at US$3 billion in 1988. Meanwhile,
Chile converted about US$2 billion of external debt
into peso-denominated assets under its formal
Chapter 18 and 19 programmes. Finally Argentina
registered US$1 bn in formal swaps, plus an
undisclosed amount of informal transactions.
While the volume of debt-equity swaps has risen
markedly in recent years, so have the polemics
surrounding them.22 One of the major concerns raised
by the debtor countries has been related to their weak
fiscal situation and the inflationary effects of
converting foreign debt into currency and notes. These
and other problems with swaps caused Mexico to halt
its formal programme in 1987, while both Brazil and
Argentina temporarily suspended their operations in
early 1989. On the other hand, Chile, with a relatively
sound fiscal situation, continued to aggressively
promote its swap programme.
Finally, another important, but informal and less
publicised process for reducing debt in 1988, was the
accumulation of arrears. This process not only reduces
the immediate outlays for debt service, but also tends
to drive down secondary market prices for the debt
and opens up opportunities for eventual settlements at
less than face value. During the course of 1988 a
surprisingly large number of highly indebted countries
found themselves deploying this non-menu option to
reduce debt-servicing burdens.23
The review of some of the major financial operations
in heavily indebted countries highlights some of the
shortcomings of the Menu. First, the voluntary
response of the banks to the debt reduction schemes
was very poor. This was due to a complex
constellation of factors: free riding, sharp differences
in the ability of the banks to absorb losses,
disincentives arising from bank regulatory and tax
codes, fears of precedent, and difficulties in creating
preferential status for new debt instruments.
21 World Bank, op. cit., table 8.
22 For an evaluation of some of the potential negative effects of swaps
see Group of Thirty. 1987. Finance for Developing Countries, New
York: Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, December 1987. 'Conversión de
Pagarés de la Deuda Externa en Chile, ColeecióuuEsuudios CIEPLAN
22. pp.41-62 and Eugenio Lahera, September 1987. 'La Conversión
de la Deuda Externa: Antecedentes. Evaluación y Perspectivas',
Santiago, Chile, CEPAL, LC/R.614.
22 In Latin America alone more than half of the countries with bank
debt were in arrears in 1988. See CEPAL, December 1988, Balance
Preliminar de la Economía Latinoamericana 1988', Notas Sobre la
Economía t el Desarrollo, No. 470/471, Santiago, Chile, p. ii.
15
Second, the ability of the problem debtors to
undertake direct buybacks, or to enhance exchange
offers was limited by the scarcity of their own foreign
exchange resources, legitimate questions about the
best alternative use of those resources, and in the
particular case of debt-equity swaps, the implications
of those conversions on expanded domestic money
supply and inflation.
Third, negotiations with the banks for voluntary debt
reduction were usually protracted, due in part to the
need to gain waivers n restrictive clauses In loan
contracts. This, coupled with the uncertain response
of the banks to exchange offers even when they were
approved, created great uncertainties regarding the
volume and timing of external financing via voluntary
debt reduction techniques.
Fourth, the time path of effective cash flow relief
granted by market-based voluntary debt reduction
techniques tended to be exactly the inverse of what was
needed for programme debtors with a very high social
rate of discount for foreign exchange. In effect, most
of the techniques stressed reduced principal, the
payment of which had already been pushed off into the
distant future by restructurings or moratoria, and
which at the margin had an extremely low expected
value. The effective balance of payments relief
therefore was limited to lower interest payments;
however these fell by only a tenth or less of every dollar
of debt reduction.
When financial instruments that act more directly on
interest payments were deployed by the debtors, such
as exit bonds, interest savings tended to be marginal.
This was because of the factors just cited in point one
16
above, and the fact that the uncertain return of exit
bonds had to compete with the certain return ofan exit
via a cash sale in secondary markets (which has no
direct benefits for the debtor). When countries tried to
enhance the response to their exchange offers through
self-financed collaterisation, the net balance between
the use of scarce foreign exchange and the savings of
foreign exchange was initially unfavourable for the
debtor and not rectified for many years.
Fifth, new money was increasingly difficult to raise
from the banks as they became more reserved against
loans losses and more engaged in exposure reduction.
Sixth, the Menu's options, whether in the form of new
resources or debt reduction, tended to be applied very
unevenly across the debtor countries, with its limited
benefits being concentrated in only a handful of
countries.
In sum, as CEPAL observed in 1988, the operation of
the Menu revealed some interesting appetisers for
some debtor countries, but the 'main entrees' simply
were not there.24 When left to their own devices,
private markets typically unwind from a debt
overhang only very slowly. Hence the Menu Approach
as then conceived could only chip away at the corners
of the debtors' financing constraint. Indeed, the debt
management strategy clearly did not address a central
macroeconomic problem: how to finance in a
sustained and predictable way the economic reforms
and new investments that the highly indebted
countries will need to initiate growth now and begin to
restore their capacity to service debts.
24 CEPAL. Evolución del Problema de la Deuda Externa en América,
op.cil., p.49.
